This paper identi…es a limit to arbitrage that arises from the fact that a …rm's fundamental value is endogenous to the act of exploiting the arbitrage opportunity. Trading on private information reveals this information to managers and helps them improve their real decisions, in turn enhancing fundamental value. While this increases the pro…tability of a long position, it reduces the pro…tability of a short position -selling on negative information reveals to the manager that …rm prospects are poor, causing him to cancel investment projects. Optimal abandonment increases the …rm's value and may cause the speculator to realize a loss on her initial sale. Thus, investors may strategically refrain from trading on negative information. The asymmetry of this e¤ect may explain why bad news is incorporated more slowly into prices than good news (e.g. Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000).) Moreover, it has potentially important real consequences -if negative information is not incorporated into stock prices, negative-NPV projects will not be abandoned, leading to overinvestment. In contrast to theories based on private bene…ts, here overinvestment arises even in the absence of agency problems -the manager maximizes …rm value and attempts to learn from prices to do so. While existing limits to arbitrage rely on market frictions, which will likely decline as …nancial markets develop, here the market performs its most e¢ cient role -guiding the allocation of real resources. Thus, our e¤ect may strengthen as investors become increasingly sophisticated and managers learn to a greater extent from them.
Introduction
Whether …nancial markets are informationally e¢ cient is one of the most hotly-contested debates in …nance. Proponents of market e¢ ciency argue that pro…t opportunities in the …nancial market will lead speculators to trade in a way that eliminates any mispricing. For example, if speculators have negative information about a stock, and this information is not re ‡ected in the price, they will …nd it pro…table to sell the stock. This will push down the price, causing it to re ‡ect speculators'information. However, a sizable literature identi…es limits to arbitrage, which may cause the process to break down and prevent information from being re ‡ected in the price. For example, De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) show that the slow convergence of price to fundamental value may render arbitrage activities too risky. This in turn dissuades traders from trading on their information if they have short horizons, which may arise from informational frictions with their own investors. Other explanations for limited arbitrage rely on market frictions such as short-sales constraints. All of these mechanisms treat the …rm's fundamental value as exogenous and rely on market imperfections to explain why speculators will not drive the price towards fundamental value. Thus, as …nancial markets develop, these limits to arbitrage may weaken.
In this paper, we identify a quite di¤erent limit to arbitrage, which does not rely on market imperfections and thus may not attenuate with the development of …nancial markets. Instead it stems from the fact that the underlying value of the asset is endogenous to the act of exploiting the arbitrage -it depends on speculators'trading behavior and market prices. The argument is based on the idea that speculators, who trade in …nancial markets, lead to price changes that reveal information to decision makers in the real side of the economy (managers, capital providers, employees, customers, regulators, etc.). These decision makers then take decisions based on the information and change the underlying value of the asset. This may make the initial trading unpro…table, hindering it from occurring in the …rst place.
To …x ideas, consider the following example. Suppose that a …rm (acquirer) announces an acquisition of another …rm (target). Also assume that some speculators conducted some analysis suggesting that this acquisition will be value-destructive. Traditional theory suggests that these speculators should sell the stock of the acquirer, attempting to pro…t from (what they believe is) the low underlying value (due to the upcoming acquisition). However, large-scale selling in the …nancial market will convey to the acquirer that speculators believe the acquisition is a bad idea. As a result, the acquirer might end up cancelling the acquisition. This implies, however, that the underlying negative information possessed by speculators is no longer relevant, and hence they should not trade on it. In other words, knowing that negative information from the market will cause decision makers to "…x" the underlying problem, speculators prefer not to trade on this information, and so it ends up not being re ‡ected in market price.
Our mechanism is based on the presence of a feedback e¤ect from the …nancial market to real economic decisions. A common perception is that managers should know more about their own …rms than outsiders (e.g. Myers and Majluf (1984) ). However, there are dimensions on which they can clearly bene…t from outside assessments and information, e.g., they can learn about the demand for their products or about potential synergies with target …rms. In particular, while the manager likely has more information than a single investor, the stock market aggregates information from millions of investors who may collectively know more than the manager (Hayek (1945) .) An episode cited as a classical example of how information from the stock market helps shape managerial decisions is Coca-Cola's attempted acquisition of Quaker Oats in 2000. On November 20, 2000 , the Wall Street Journal reported that Coca-Cola was in talks to acquire Quaker Oats. Shortly thereafter, Coca-Cola con…rmed such discussions. The market reacted negatively, sending Coca-Cola's shares down almost 8% on November 20th, and more than 2% on November 21st. Coca-Cola management brought the deal to its board on November 21st, and the board rejected the acquisition later that evening. The following day, Coca-Cola's shares rebounded almost 8%. Thus, speculators who had sold on the initial merger announcement, based on the belief that the acquisition would destroy value, ended up losing money -precisely the e¤ect modeled by this paper. In the same context, Luo (2005) provides large-sample evidence that acquisitions are more likely to be cancelled if the market reacts negatively to them, and that the e¤ect is more pronounced when …rms are more likely to have something to learn from the market. More broadly, Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) show that the sensitivity of investment to price is higher when the price contains more private information not known to managers.
An important aspect of our theory is that it generates asymmetry between trading on negative information and trading on positive information. The feedback e¤ect in our model generates an equilibrium where speculators trade on positive news but do not trade on negative news. Yet, it does not give rise to the opposite equilibrium, where speculators trade on negative news but do not trade on positive news. The intuition is as follows. When speculators trade on information, they improve the e¢ ciency of the …rm's decisions -regardless of the direction of their trade. If the speculator has positive information on a …rm's prospects, trading on it will reveal to the manager that investment is pro…table. This will in turn cause the …rm to invest more, thus increasing its value. If the speculator has negative information, trading on it will reveal to the manager that investment is unpro…table. This will in turn cause the …rm to invest less, also increasing its value as contraction is the correct decision. When a speculator buys and takes a long position in a …rm, he bene…ts further from increasing its value via the feedback e¤ect. By contrast, when he sells and takes a short position, he loses from increasing the …rm's value via the feedback e¤ect. Hence, according to our model, the feedback e¤ect will prevent negative information, but not positive information, from being re ‡ected in the price. This is related to the empirical evidence by Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) that bad news is incorporated in prices more slowly than good news. Our model presents a mechanism that can explain this …nding.
The asymmetry of our e¤ect may generate important real consequences. Since negative information is not incorporated into prices, it does not in ‡uence management decisions. Thus, while positive-NPV projects will be encouraged, some negative-NPV projects will not be canceled, leading to overinvestment overall. In contrast to standard overinvestment theories which are based on the manager's private bene…ts (e.g., Jensen (1986) , Stulz (1990) , Zwiebel (1996) ), here the manager is fully aligned with …rm value and there are no agency problems. The manager wishes to maximize …rm value by learning from prices, but is unable to do so since speculators refrain from revealing their information. Applied to M&A as well as organic investment, the theory may explain why M&A appears to be "excessive"and a large fraction of acquisitions destroy value (see, e.g., Andrade, Mitchell, and Sta¤ord (2001) .)
As mentioned above, the primary motivation for our paper is to identify a limit to arbitrage. Di¤erent authors have emphasized di¤erent factors that lead to limits on arbitrage activities. Campbell and Kyle (1993) focus on fundamental risk, i.e., the risk that the …rm's fundamentals will change while the arbitrage strategy is being pursued. In their model, such changes are unrelated to speculators' arbitrage activities. De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) argue that noise-trading risk, i.e., the risk that noise trading will increase the degree of mispricing, may render arbitrage activities unpro…table. Noise trading only a¤ects the asset's market price and not its fundamental value, which is again exogenous to the act of arbitrage. Many authors (e.g., Ponti¤ (1996) , Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) , and Mitchell, Pulvino, and Sta¤ord (2002)) focus on the transaction costs and holding costs that arbitrageurs have to incur while pursuing an arbitrage strategy. Others (Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2002) , and Lamont and Thaler (2003) ) discuss the importance of short-sales constraints. While these papers emphasize market frictions as the source of limits to arbitrage, our paper shows that limits to arbitrage arise when the market performs its utmost e¢ cient role: guiding the allocation of real resources. Thus, limits to arbitrage based on market frictions may attenuate with the development of …nancial markets, the e¤ect identi…ed by this paper may strengthen -as investors become more sophisticated, managers will learn from them to a greater degree.
Our paper is related to the literature exploring the theoretical implications of the feedback e¤ects from market prices to real decision making. Several papers in this literature have shown that the fact that market prices a¤ect …rms' decisions and values can be harmful for real e¢ ciency. Most closely related is Goldstein and Guembel (2008) , which shows that the feedback e¤ect provides an incentive to uninformed speculators to short sell a stock, reducing its value by having a real decision based on false information. Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott (2010), Dow, Goldstein, and Guembel (2010), and Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and Yuan (2010) also model complexities arising from the feedback e¤ect. The point in our paper -that negatively informed speculators will strategically withhold information from the market knowing that the release of negative information will lead managers to …x the underlying problem -is new in this literature.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model that generates the limits to arbitrage. Section 3 discusses potential applications of the model, and Section 4 concludes. Appendix A contains all proofs not in the main text.
The Model
We consider a …rm with a single share outstanding. The …rm's manager is considering whether to abandon a risky investment project which it is currently pursuing. The manager's goal is to maximize …rm value; since there are no agency problems between the manager and the …rm, we will use these two terms interchangeably. There are two possible states of nature, 2 fH; Lg. The common prior that the state is = H is p = 1 2
; we use q to denote the posterior belief that = H. The manager's choice is denoted d 2 f0; 1g, where d = 0 represents continuing the investment and d = 1 represents abandonment (also referred to as a "corrective action"). The value of the project depends on both the true state of nature and the manager's action, and is summarized in the following table:
Continuation is optimal in the good state of nature H, i.e. R 0 
The value of represents a "cuto¤" that determines the manager's action. If and only if his posterior belief q is greater than , he will continue the project. Since …rm value is higher in state H under continuation, but lower under abandonment, for state H to be a truly good state, it must be that continuation occurs most frequently, i.e. is the ex-ante optimal decision. Since p = 1 2 , this entails specifying that < 1 2 . Appendix B considers the opposite case of > 1 2 and demonstrates that an asymmetric limit to arbitrage continues to exist. With probability < 1, there is a speculator in the stock market. (The assumption that < 1 is similar to Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2004) , where the speculator is only present with uncertainty). If the speculator is present, she sees the state of nature with certainty and chooses to trade s. We will use the term "positively-informed speculator" to describe a speculator who observes = H, and "negatively-informed speculator"to describe a speculator who observes = L. There is a noise trader who trades n from the set f 1; 0; 1g randomly with uniform probability. As in Kyle (1985) , the competitive market maker does not observe , nor the individual trades s and n. However, she observes the total order ‡ow X = s + n and sets the price equal to expected …rm value conditional upon the order ‡ow, i.e. p = E(vjX), where v is …rm value. To avoid revealing her information, it is clear that the speculator must camou ‡age with the noise trader. Thus she will either sell one unit, buy one unit or not trade, i.e. s 2 f 1; 0; 1g. If she decides to trade (in either direction), she pays the trading cost .
Like the market maker, the manager does not observe , s or n but does observe X. (As is standard, e.g. Dow, Goldstein and Guembel (2010) , allowing the manager to observe order ‡ow X has the same e¤ect as allowing him to observe the price p as there is a one-to-one correspondence between the price and the order ‡ow.) He uses the information in X to form his posterior q and thus decide whether to abandon or continue the project.
In sum, we de…ne the speculator's strategy as a function S : ! f 1; 0; 1g, the market maker's strategy as a function P : Q ! R (where Q = f 2; 1; 0; 1; 2g), and the …rm's strategy as a function D : Q ! f0; 1g. After the trading price is determined and the continuation decision has been taken, all players receive their payo¤s. The speculator's payo¤ is s(v p) jsj and the …rm's payo¤ is R d . We use the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBE) as the solution concept.
An Equilibrium With Limits to Arbitrage
We show that an asymmetric limit to arbitrage will exist (i.e. the positively-informed speculator will buy one share, but the negatively-informed speculator will not trade) under certain parametric assumptions. We discuss the role of these assumptions in Section 2.2. We …rst assume that the speculator pursues the following strategy:
i.e. the positively-informed speculator never sells and the negatively-informed speculator never buys. (We will prove this formally later.) Using Bayes'rule and sequential rationality gives the posterior q, the manager's decision d and the price p as follows:
Lemma 1 Assume that the positively-informed speculator never sells and the negatively-informed speculator never buys. For a given order ‡ow X, the posterior q, the manager's decision d and the price p are given by the following table:
where the question mark ? denotes that the outcome depends on parameter values.
Proof. The posteriors q are calculated from Bayes' rule and given in the Appendix. The manager takes d = 1 if q < (where < ) and d = 0 otherwise. The price p is given by qR
We can use Lemma 1 to derive the optimal trading behavior of the speculator, i.e. the variables H and L . We …rst assume that she is positively-informed. If she chooses to buy one unit:
With probability (w.p.) 1 3 , X = 2 and she is fully revealed. Thus, trading pro…ts are zero.
W.p. 1 3 , X = 1 and she pays 1 2
The fundamental value of each share is R 0 H , and so her pro…t is
W.p. 1 3 , X = 0 and she pays
Thus, her expected gross pro…t is given by:
Thus, if the trading cost is su¢ ciently small (i.e. less than equation (1)), the positivelyinformed speculator will always buy and so H = 1. This strategy in turn a¤ects the market maker and manager's posterior upon observing X = 1. Since X = 1 is inconsistent with the speculator buying, and the speculator always buys if positively informed, the only way the state can be good is if the speculator is absent. Thus we have q( 1) = : the posterior is higher the more likely the speculator is to be absent (i.e. the lower is). Whether this posterior is su¢ ciently low to drive the manager to abandon the project depends on whether 1 2 is greater or less than the critical value . We make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 means that, when X = 1, the manager is su¢ ciently pessimistic and chooses to abandon the project -even though there is a possibility that the negative order ‡ow arises because the speculator is absent (rather than negatively-informed) and so = H. We make Assumption 1 for the remainder of this section and consider the opposite case of 1 2 > in Section 2.2.1 later.
Then, if X = 1, the manager takes the corrective action and Lemma 1 becomes:
We now consider the negatively-informed speculator. If she chooses to sell one unit:
W.p. 1 3 , X = 2 and she is fully revealed, so trading pro…ts are zero.
W.p. 1 3 , X = 1 and she receives
This pro…t is negative, even though she is trading in the direction of her information. This loss constitutes the limit to arbitrage that is the central contribution of this paper. The complexity in generating a limit to arbitrage is that the price the speculator receives from the market maker must be di¤erent from her fundamental valuation of the share, so that she loses money by trading. A di¤erence in valuations in turn requires information asymmetry between the market maker and the speculator. It is not automatic that such an asymmetry will exist. There can never be asymmetric beliefs on whether the manager takes the corrective action -this is because the manager makes his decision based on total order ‡ow, which the market maker also observes, and so the market maker perfectly predicts the manager's action when setting his price. Indeed, if X = 1, both the speculator and the market maker know that correction will take place.
Instead, the limit to arbitrage exists because, even though both agree that abandonment will occur if X = 1, they disagree on the value of the …rm conditional on abandonment. The speculator knows that the corrective action will be taken (since q ( 1) < ), and that correction is desirable for …rm value (since she knows with certainty that = L), and so the fundamental value of the …rm is R 1 L . In contrast, the market maker knows the corrective action will be taken (since q ( 1) < ) but is not certain that correction is desirable for …rm value, because she is unsure of the underlying state of nature . While the speculator observes perfectly, the market maker can only infer it from the order ‡ow X. Order ‡ow X = 1 is consistent with the speculator not being present and the noise trader selling 1 share. Hence, it is possible that = H, in which case the manager's corrective action is undesirable. Therefore, the market maker sets a lower price than the fundamental value perceived by the speculator, and so selling will cause the speculator to lose money.
Selling by the speculator creates a feedback e¤ect -it reveals to the manager that = L and that correction is desirable. Conveying information to the manager improves his decision, changing it from continuation to optimal abandonment. Improved decisionmaking in turn enhances fundamental …rm value, and thus reduces the pro…tability of taking a short position. Arbitrage is limited because the value of the asset being arbitraged is endogenous to the act of arbitrage.
W.p. 1 3 , X = 0 and she receives 
Thus, the speculator's overall pro…t from selling is
The …rst (positive) term is the pro…t if X = 0. It represents the "fundamental"e¤ect which is common to all informed trading models where …rm value is exogenous of the trading processthe speculator pro…ts from buying on a positive signal. With X = 0, order ‡ow is uninformative and so the manager takes the ex-ante optimal decision of continuation. Thus, the order ‡ow does not create any feedback, and so …rm value is una¤ected. The second (negative) term is the pro…t if X = 1. It stems from the "feedback"e¤ect which is unique to this paper and arises because …rm value is endogenous to the act of arbitrage: selling causes the manager to take the optimal action, which causes the speculator to make a loss.
If equation (2) is less than , the negatively-informed speculator never sells, and so L = 0. The concurrence of L = 0 and H = 1 is the limit to arbitrage: a positively-informed speculator always buys, but the negatively-informed speculator never sells. The reason for the asymmetry is that the feedback e¤ect is inherently asymmetric. Trading on information (both buying on good information and selling on bad information) improves price informativeness, regardless of the direction of the trade. This greater price informativeness always improves the manager's decision. This (weakly) 1 augments the pro…tability of a long position, but reduces the pro…tability of a short position. With L = 0, the pro…ts from a positively-informed speculator buying (1) become:
Therefore, a necessary condition for the trading cost to make H = 1 and L = 0 consistent with an equilibrium is:
The trading cost must be su¢ ciently high that a negatively-informed speculator does not wish to sell, but su¢ ciently low that a positively-informed speculator does wish to sell. The set of possible trading costs that satisfy equation (3) is non-empty. A exists if and only if:
which always holds, because the left-hand side is positive and the right-hand side is negative. Intuitively, since the feedback e¤ect (weakly) enhances the pro…tability of a long position and reduces the pro…tability of a short position, the pro…ts from informed buying exceed the pro…ts from informed selling, and so there are a continuum of trading costs in between that will satisfy equation (3) . The …nal table is given by:
We now return to the question of whether the positively-informed speculator indeed wishes to buy. If she instead decides to sell: W.p. 1 3 , X = 0. She receives
W.p. 1 3 , X = 1. She receives
W.p. Thus, the positively-informed speculator can make a pro…t by selling -because she can dupe the manager to taking the corrective action, knowing that the corrective action is undesirable because the state is actually good. Since she has a short position, she bene…ts from the manager taking the incorrect action. Her overall pro…ts are given by:
For the positively-informed speculator to choose buying over selling, her pro…ts must be greater under the former. This requires:
The …rst term is the "fundamental" e¤ect, which represents the pro…ts from trading in the direction of one's private information. The second term is the "feedback" e¤ect, which arises because selling manipulates the order ‡ow and causes the manager to take the wrong decision. We must verify that condition (5) is consistent with Assumption 1. For (5) to hold, we require to be not too high, else the market maker views the order ‡ow as more informative, and so the speculator can gain more by manipulating the order ‡ow. For Assumption 1, we require to be not too low: the order ‡ow must be su¢ ciently informative that if X = 1, the manager changes his decision from continuation to correction (i.e. there is feedback from the order ‡ow to the manager's action). Recall is de…ned by:
We thus require
Thus, under the following condition, we can always …nd a close to 1, such that the two conditions hold simultaneously.
To see this, equation (6) guarantees that when the speculator is present and = H, she will choose to buy, because the RHS of condition (5) is bounded above by 2(R
we can always …nd a close to 1, such that > (5) is consistent with Assumption 1.
Finally, we study whether the negatively-informed speculator will buy, rather than sell. If she buys:
W.p. 
It is intuitive that the negatively-informed speculator never wishes to buy. Trading in the opposite direction of one's information causes the manager to make the wrong decision. Thus, it can only be pro…table if the speculator establishes a short position. Hence, while the positivelyinformed speculator may have an incentive to sell, the negatively-informed speculator will never wish to buy.
We therefore have an equilibrium in which there are limits to arbitrage. The positivelyinformed speculator always buys, but the negatively-informed speculator never sells. This result is stated formally in Proposition 1 below: Proposition 1 (Asymmetric limits to arbitrage.) Assume that Assumption 1 and equations (3) and (5) hold. There exists an equilibrium in which H = 1 and L = 0, i.e. the speculator always buys on positive information, but never trades on negative information.
The source of the limit to arbitrage is the feedback e¤ect. Formally, we de…ne the feedback e¤ect as being in existence when the manager's decision d is a¤ected by the order ‡ow X for X 2 f 1; 0; 1g. We only consider the cases of X 2 f 1; 0; 1g since the speculator's information is fully revealed when X = 2 and X = 2 and her trading pro…ts are automatically zero; thus, the manager's decision d is irrelevant. In the above equilibrium, we have d = 1 for X = 1 and d = 0 for X 2 f0; 1g. It is the change in the manager's decision when X = 1 which is critical for the negatively-informed speculator to make a loss when she sells. The feedback e¤ect would disappear in three cases: if the manager did not observe order ‡ow, if there was no managerial decision in the …rst place, or if there is insu¢ cient information contained in the order ‡ow to change the manager's decision. All three cases lead to similar outcomes; the third case is explicitly analyzed in Section 2.2.1. That section shows that relaxing Assumption 1 leads to no feedback e¤ect (d = 0 for X 2 f 1; 0; 1g) and the speculator never makes losses from selling on negative information.
Corollary 1 below states that there is never an equilibrium which contains feedback (i.e. the manager's decision d depends on the order ‡ow for X 2 f 1; 0; 1g) in which we have the opposite result of H = 0 and L = 1, for any parameter values. Thus, the only possible asymmetric equilibrium with feedback involves a negatively-informed speculator never trading and a positively-informed speculator always trading, rather than the opposite. This is intuitive -trading improves the …rm's fundamental value, which reduces the pro…tability of a short position but enhances the pro…tability of a long position.
Corollary 1 Relax the assumption that Assumption 1, equations (3) and (5) hold. For any parameter values, there does not exist an equilibrium in which H = 0 and L = 1 and the manager's decision d depends on the order ‡ow for X 2 f 1; 0; 1g.
Discussion
This section discusses the role of our assumptions in creating the limit to arbitrage. These assumptions in turn lead to empirical predictions, since they demonstrate under what conditions the limit to arbitrage will exist.
1 2

>
We now relax Assumption 1 and consider the opposite case of 1 2 > . Recall that 1 2 is the manager's posterior probability of = H if he observes X = 1. With 1 2 > , the posterior is su¢ ciently high that the manager does not take the corrective action if X = 1. We now have
The case of the positively-informed speculator buying is the same as in the core model. If the negatively-informed speculator sells: W.p. 1 3 , X = 2 and she is fully revealed, so trading pro…ts are zero.
W.p. 1 3 , X = 1 and she receives 
Critically, unlike under Assumption 1, the pro…t is positive. This is because selling does not change the manager's decision: he is still continuing the project. Thus, there is only the "fundamental" e¤ect of trading in the direction of one's private information, and no confounding feedback e¤ect.
Overall, the ex-ante pro…t from selling on negative information is
which is unambiguously positive. Thus, if
we have L = 1: the speculator does sell on negative information, and there is no limit to arbitrage because there is no feedback e¤ect. If (7) does not hold, then the transaction costs are su¢ ciently high to deter informed selling. We thus have L = 0, and so the positively-informed speculator's pro…ts from buying are
, the speculator never trades on information in either direction. For the intermediate case for which
then the equilibrium does involve H = 1 and L = 0, an asymmetric limit to arbitrage as in the core model. However, this limit to arbitrage is not driven by feedback: for X 2 f 1; 0; 1g (the only cases in which the speculator is not fully revealed), the manager's decision is always d = 0 -it is una¤ected by the order ‡ow, and there is no feedback e¤ect. This is why the negativelyinformed speculator makes positive pro…ts from selling if X = 1, whereas in the core model she makes a loss in this case. Assumption 1 is necessary in the core model to create feedback and trading losses, since if and only if 1 2 < , the posterior upon X = 1 is su¢ ciently low to change the manager's decision from continuation to correction: we have d = 1 for X = 1 and d = 0 for X 2 f0; 1g, so order ‡ow does a¤ect the manager's decision. Feedback can only exist if there is su¢ cient uncertainty over the optimal decision that the information revealed by the order ‡ow is sometimes su¢ ciently strong to change the manager's action. The case of 1 2 > , where the order ‡ow does not a¤ect the manager's decision, is equivalent to the equilibrium that would prevail if the manager could not observe the order ‡ow, or if the manager did not take any decision to begin with.
Instead, the intuition for the asymmetric limit to arbitrage is as follows. Given that the equilibrium involves not selling on negative information, buying is highly pro…table. This is because the speculator earns high pro…ts not only if X = 0, but also if X = 1. Since the speculator does not sell on negative information, X = 1 is fully consistent with the speculator not selling and having negative information, and so the speculator sets a low price of
This allows the speculator to make high pro…ts by selling. Conversely, given the equilibrium involves buying on positive information, selling is not pro…table. This is because the speculator only earns high pro…ts if X = 0, but not if X = 1. Since she always buys on negative information, and X = 1 is inconsistent with her buying, it must be that the speculator has negative information (or is absent). Hence the market maker sets a low price, meaning the speculator earns low pro…ts by selling if X = 1. Indeed, if the speculator is always present, then the pro…ts if X = 1 are zero.
To highlight that the asymmetry does not arise through feedback, for the case in which d = 0 for X 2 f 1; 0; 1g, there is also an equilibrium in which H = 0 and L = 1. In this equilibrium, the speculator's strategy is:
which is consistent with the following equilibrium:
Note that X = 2 is o¤ the equilibrium path so we have freedom to specify any belief. We choose q = 1 as this is su¢ cient to support the equilibrium of H = 0 and L = 1. Again, there is no feedback (regardless of what we choose for q (X = 2) since d = 0 for X 2 f 1; 0; 1g. Simple calculations give the positively-informed speculator's pro…ts from buying as 
, which is higher. The intuition is exactly analogous to the earlier case of H = 1 and L = 0: given that the equilibrium involves not trading on positive information and selling on negative information, the speculator does not wish to deviate from this. If (8) holds, then a positively-informed speculator will not buy but a negatively-informed speculator will sell. If also
then the positively-informed speculator will not sell either, so the equilibrium of H = 0 and L = 1 is sustainable.
In sum, the assumption of 1 2 > is necessary to generate a limit to arbitrage that arises through the feedback e¤ect. This is intuitive, since it means that order ‡ow is su¢ ciently informative to change the manager's decision.
Speculator Is Sometimes Absent
In the core model, the speculator is only present with probability < 1. This is necessary for the limit to arbitrage to exist. Recall that a limit to arbitrage requires asymmetry in beliefs between the market maker and the speculator -while they inevitably both agree on what action the manager will take (for a given order ‡ow), they must disagree on whether the action is desirable for …rm value for the speculator to make a loss. In the core model, this disagreement occurs at X = 1: both the speculator and market maker know that correction will occur, but the speculator knows with certainty that correction is desirable and values the …rm highly, whereas the market maker is not certain that correction is desirable and so sets a low price. It is necessary for < 1 to create this asymmetry. Observing X = 1 tells the market maker that the speculator cannot have bought. With = 1, the speculator is always present. Since she is always informed, the only way that she could not have bought is if she has negative information. Thus, the market maker knows with certainty that = L, and has exactly the same posterior as the speculator (q = 0). She sets a price of R 1 L , which is exactly the speculator's valuation and so the speculator does not make a loss. By contrast, with < 1, the absence of a purchasing speculator is consistent with = H: it could be that the true state is good, and the low total order ‡ow is because the speculator is not present. Thus, she puts weight on correction being suboptimal and so sets a low price. Put di¤erently, < 1 creates an information asymmetry between the speculator and the market maker -the speculator knows whether she is present, but the market maker does not. This in turn creates asymmetry in beliefs -the speculator and the market maker attach di¤erent valuations to the …rm, which creates the limit to arbitrage.
We would achieve the same result by instead assuming that the speculator is always present and informed, but can only trade with probability -for example, if with probability 1 she receives a liquidity shock that prevents her from trading. Thus, for a limit to arbitrage to exist, there must be su¢ cient uncertainty over whether there is a speculator who can tradeeither because there is uncertainty over whether she is present, or there is uncertainty over her ability to trade conditional upon being present.
Applications
This section discusses some potential applications of our model. The …rst is that this paper identi…es a limit to arbitrage which, in contrast to alternative explanations, is likely to per-sist over time even as markets evolve and investors become more sophisticated. One existing source of limited arbitrage is market frictions such as short-sales constraints, which will likely diminish with the development of …nancial markets. (The only market imperfection that our model requires is trading costs, which exist even in developed …nancial markets). A second is that mutual fund investors make their allocation decisions based on short-run measures of performance, which leads to mutual funds avoiding arbitrages that will only converge in the long run (Shleifer and Vishny (1997) ). Such behavior can either be irrational over-extrapolation, or rational if they have limited information on the fund manager's quality but instead must infer it imperfectly from short-run performance. Either way, if investor sophistication and information improve over time, this force will also diminish.
By contrast, the limit to arbitrage analyzed by this paper stems from …rm value being endogenous to the act of arbitrage. This is a fundamental force that does not rely on market imperfections, investor irrationality or investor limited information, and so may continue to persist over time. All agents in the model act with full rationality: for example, the market maker takes into account the manager's learning when setting the price, and this in turn a¤ects the speculator's decision to trade. If anything, the limit to arbitrage may increase with investor sophistication, as this augments the extent to which speculators have value-relevant information which the manager attempts to learn by observing the price.
The second main category of applications stems from the fact that the limit to arbitrage is asymmetric. While the speculator buys on good information, he does not sell on bad information. As a result, negative information will enter into prices more slowly, as found empirically by Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) . While Hong, Lim and Stein's results are consistent with the Hong and Stein (1999) model that news travels more slowly in small …rms with low analyst coverage, Hong and Stein do not predict an asymmetry between good and bad news. Another di¤erence is that ours is a fully rational model that does not require behavioral biases among investors.
Moreover, the feedback e¤ect means that the lack of negative information in prices will have further consequences on real decisions. In particular, if speculators choose not to trade on negative information, then such negative information does not become incorporated into stock prices and fails to in ‡uence the manager's behavior. Thus, some negative-NPV projects will not be optimally abandoned, leading to overinvestment. Critically, overinvestment does not occur because the manager is pursuing private bene…ts, as in the standard theories of Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990) and Zwiebel (1996) . In contrast, the manager is fully aligned with …rm value and there are no agency problems. The manager wishes to maximize …rm value by learning from prices, but is unable to do so since speculators refrain from impounding their information into prices. Note that overinvestment occurs even though the manager is fully aware that the speculator does not trade on negative information and takes this into account.
The above overinvestment result can apply to M&A as well as organic expansion. Luo (2005) shows that managers sometimes use the market reaction to announced M&A deals to guide whether they should cancel the acquisition. While he …nds that some transactions are canceled in equilibrium, it may be that there are other negative-NPV deals that should optimally be canceled but are not because speculators do not impound their negative views into prices. This may explain why a large proportion of M&A deals destroy value (see, e.g., Andrade, Mitchell and Sta¤ord (2001) .)
The theory also has potential implications for the short-and long-run returns to M&A announcements. We …rst consider a world in which the manager never learns from prices. If managers choose good and bad M&A deals randomly and completes all deals, then both shortand long-run returns should be zero. If the manager learns fully from prices and there are no limits to arbitrage (i.e. negative information always gets incorporated into prices), then some bad deals will be subsequently canceled. Hence, the average quality of a completed M&A deal will be strictly positive; since the market knows this at the time of announcement, short-run returns should be positive and long-run returns should be zero. The model considers a third case: the manager only partially learns from prices. Thus, some value-destructive deals go through. Moreover, conditional upon a transaction destroying value, the negative returns are realized mostly after completion, rather than at announcement. While some speculators may have negative information at the time of announcement, they do not impound this information into prices due to the limit to arbitrage. Thus, the value-destructiveness of the transaction only manifests itself after completion.
In sum, the model predicts a positive event-study reaction on average -value-creating deals lead to a positive return, and value destructive deals do not lead to a signi…cantly negative return, so the average return is positive. However, long-run returns are negative as some deals turn out to be undesirable ex post. This combination of positive event-study returns and negative long-run returns has been documented empirically by Agrawal, Ja¤e and Mandelker (1992) and Rau and Vermaelen (1998) . For the vast majority of corporate events, the long-run drift is in the same direction as the initial announcement return (see Barberis and Thaler (2003) for a survey) and this is interpreted as resulting from underreaction. However, underreaction cannot explain why the short-run returns to M&A are in a di¤erent direction to the long-run outcomes. Our framework o¤ers a potential explanation, although it does require the market not to be fully aware of the limit to arbitrage identi…ed by the model.
Our theory also provides a potential explanation for why investor out ‡ows from mutual funds upon poor performance are less pronounced than fund in ‡ows upon good performance, as found by Lynch and Musto (1999) . Their explanation is that poor performance will lead to the fund family taking corrective actions, such as replacing the fund manager, removing the incentive to withdraw from a poorly-performing fund. In that paper, investors'fund ‡ows have no direct e¤ect on the fund family's decision to undertake a corrective action, which is instead purely based on the fund performance. Our model (applied to a mutual fund setting) suggests that the fund family will learn from investor ‡ows in order to guide their correction decision, and so investors may choose not to withdraw as withdrawal will directly a¤ect the family's decision. It is thus most applicable to mutual fund investors with detailed information on management quality, such as funds-of-funds or large institutional investors.
Conclusion
This paper has modeled a limit to arbitrage that stems from the fact that …rm value is endogenous to the act of exploiting the arbitrage. We showed that investors may refrain from trading on negative information even in the absence of short-sale constraints, risk aversion or short horizons. Instead, the speculator strategically withholds negative information to avoid it improving the manager's investment decisions and causing her to realize a loss on her short position. The model can potentially explain why negative information is incorporated into prices more slowly than positive information, why managers may overinvest even in the absence of agency problems, and the concurrence of positive short-term returns to M&A with negative long-term returns.
A Proofs Proof of Lemma 1
Given the speculator's strategy, any X 2 Q is on the path of play. So from Bayes'rule, we have q(X) = Pr(HjX) = Pr(XjH) Pr(XjH) + Pr(XjL) :
We thus have:
Then, sequential rationality implies the table in Lemma 1.
Proof of Corollary 1
Consider an equilibrium with H = 0 and L = 1. Now the speculator's strategy is:
Then, Bayes'rule and sequential rationality imply the following:
The calculation of q for X 2 f 2; 1; 0; 1g is from Bayes'rule. X = 2 is o¤ the equilibrium path and so we can specify any belief; we denote it byq. We can immediately see that the manager's decision is d = 0 for the intermediate order ‡ows of X 2 f 1; 0; 1g. Thus, any equilibrium in which H = 0 and L = 1 does not involve feedback.
B The Case > 1 2
We now consider the case of > . Now, correction is the ex ante optimal decision. Since, under correction, …rm value is now higher under state L, and correction occurs more frequently with > 1 2 , seeing that = L is e¤ectively good news for the …rm. Thus, we now refer to a speculator who observes = L as positively-informed, and one who observes = H as negatively-informed. We …rst assume that the speculator pursues the following strategy:
i.e. the positively-informed speculator never sells and the negatively-informed speculator never buys. (We will prove this formally later.) Using Bayes'rule yields:
Thus, sequential rationality implies the following table:
We …rst consider the positively-informed speculator who observes = L. If she chooses to buy one unit: W.p. 1 3 , X = 2 and she is fully revealed, so trading pro…ts are zero.
W.p. 1 3 , X = 1 and she pays W.p. 1 3 , X = 0 and she pays Therefore, a positively-informed speculator will choose to buy and receives an ex-ante pro…t of We assume that 1 2 > , so that observing X = 1 causes the manager's decision to chance, i.e. there is a feedback e¤ect. The table becomes:
We now consider the negatively-informed speculator who observes = H. If she sells, W.p. 1 3 , X = 2 and she is fully revealed, so trading pro…ts are zero.
W.p. 1 3 , X = 1 and she receives W.p. 1 3 , X = 0 and she receives Note that the case of X = 1 represents a limit to arbitrage similar to the core model. By selling, the negatively-informed speculator changes the decision towards continuation. Continuation is indeed optimal since = H, and so the act of arbitrage improves the …rm's decision and reduces the pro…tability of a short position. Thus, the speculator makes a loss. Overall, her ex-ante pro…t is 
We now wish to verify that the positively-informed speculator indeed does not wish to sell, and the negatively-informed speculator indeed does not wish to buy. If the negatively-informed speculator buys, then W.p. W.p. 1 3 , X = 1 and she receives a pro…t of W.p. 1 3 , X = 0 and she receives a pro…t of W.p. 1 3 , X = 1 and she receives a pro…t of
W.p. 1 3 , X = 0 and she receives a pro…t of
The pro…t is positive if X < 0. As in the core model, by selling on good information, the speculator can dupe the manager into taking the incorrect decision -in this case, continuation even though = L. This increases the pro…tability of a short position. Her overall pro…t from selling is
. For her to prefer buying over selling, we must have:
If this is satis…ed, we indeed have H = 0 and L = 1, i.e. the negatively-informed speculator does not trade while the positively-informed speculator sells.
As in the core model, the limit to arbitrage requires that X = 1 alters the manager's prior su¢ ciently that his action changes (in this case, from correction to continuation) -i.e. there is feedback from the speculator's trade to the manager's action. Hence, 1 2 > is a necessary condition. With < we would have d (X = 1) = 1 and the manager would still abandon the project even if X = 1, so there would be no feedback.
